Scientific inquiry involves observations and measurements, some of which are planned and some of which are not. The most interesting or unusual observations might be regarded as discoveries and therefore particularly worthy of publication. However, the observational process is fraught with inferential land mines, especially if the discoveries are serendipitous. Multiple observations increase the probability of false-positive conclusions and have led to many false and otherwise misleading publications. Statisticians recommend adjustments to final inferences with the goal of reducing the rate of false positives, a strategy that increases the rate of false negatives. Some scientists object to making such adjustments, arguing that it should not be more difficult to determine the validity of a discovery simply because other observations were made. Which tack is right? How does one decide that any particular scientific discovery is real? Unfortunately, there is no panacea, no one-size-fits-all approach. The goal of this commentary is to elucidate the issues and provide recommendations for conducting and reporting results of empirical studies, with emphasis on the problems of multiple comparisons and other types of multiplicities, including what I call "silent multiplicities. " Because of the many observations, outcomes, subsets, treatments, etc, that are typically made or addressed in epidemiology and biomarker research, these recommendations may be particularly relevant for such studies. However, the lessons apply quite generally. I consider both frequentist and Bayesian statistical approaches.
While traveling in a foreign land, you pass through the town of Oz. The inhabitants seem unusually tall. You retrace your route to ask the heights of the people you had seen. The 25 adults queried averaged 4 inches taller than the mean height of their compatriots, after adjusting for sex and age. Accounting for sampling variability you calculate a t statistic and find the observation to be highly statistically significant (P < .001).
Impressive! You dash off a message to your neighborhood statistician, telling her the news. She says your calculation assumes random sampling from the population of Oz and so the P-value you calculated is misleading and exaggerates your conclusion. The sample could be biased, and for a number of reasons. For example, people who are out and about may be taller than others in the town; someone who happens to be tall is easier to observe; tall people may be more likely to respond when asked for their height; people may exaggerate their heights, perhaps rounding up; there may be a clustering effect with taller people associating with taller people, etc.
You understand and accept her points. You begin to build a case that your sample is "nearly random" when she tells you something you neither expected nor can understand. She says that even if your sample were perfectly random your P value would still be flawed. The problem, she says, is inferential multiplicity, more commonly known as "multiple comparisons." The people you observed might have been shorter, fatter, bow-legged, had bigger ears, longer hair, shorter hair, redder hair, no hair, etc. All sorts of potentially unusual aspects of Oz and its residents might have caught your attention. Moreover, your travels have taken you through many other towns, and you might have made unusual observations in any one of them. Even though you did not report observations from the other towns, the possibility of having made them means they should be included in the denominator in calculating the P value. Given the many opportunities to observe something unusual, an apparently extraordinary observation becomes quite ordinary. It is a simple matter of arithmetic: a lot of small numbers can add up to a big number.
Take the view of the statistician. She goes through life not hearing from you but knowing that your eyes are open, observing things that you're not telling her simply because they're not worth the telling. So when you do tell her something, she tries to adjust the P value to account for the denominator of possibilities. Even though neither of you has a good handle on the denominator, she suspects that it is very large and says any adjustment would render the fact that you made a discovery that is false much more likely than the P value of .001 suggests and moreover that it is surely greater than the magical cut point of .05.
You persist: "How can the fact that I might have observed something that I didn't observe change the conclusions from what I did observe? It makes no sense." You argue further: "Suppose I knew there were five professional basketball players from Oz when I planned a study, going there to ask exactly 25 randomly selected people their heights. I planned to compare the average height with the country's overall mean using a t test, and I got the result of my actual study." "Then," she says, "the P value of .001 would indeed be appropriate." Back to you: "Empirical science must utilize evidence and not preconceptions or motivations or plans of the observer. Consider two scenarios. Every observation is identical in both scenarios and indeed every molecule in the universe is aligned in precisely the same way throughout the study in both. In both scenarios I asked the heights of these same 25 people and got the same answers. In the first scenario I had planned to ask this question and in the second I asked it because they seemed tall. My asking the question doesn't change their heights. You're saying that in the first scenario I can draw a strong conclusion that people in Oz are tall and in the second I cannot." "Well, your premise is false. Your intentions reflect what you have experienced in the universe and therefore the universe is different in the two scenarios."
Your last gasp: "Okay. Suppose I planned to ask these people their heights, but I happened to have some spare time, quite independently of what I knew or thought I knew, and I made the trip more efficient by also asking about weight, hair color, etc. You're saying that I would draw a different conclusion about height even though the heights were the same whether I asked these other questions or not. Why should the mere fact that I addressed other questions affect the conclusions I draw about height?" That question is not easy to answer, but this commentary is an attempt to address it, with particular reference to epidemiological and biomarker studies.
the Ubiquity of multiplicities
Multiplicities are everywhere. Those most commonly understood are found in subset analyses (where the unit is the subset), meta-analyses (the unit is the trial or study included in the analysis), multicenter trials (the unit is the center), interim analyses, many test statistics, many variables measured, many endpoints, variables selected in regression analysis, and transformations such as taking the logarithm of an explanatory variable in regression analyses. But as the story of Oz is meant to suggest, the problem is much deeper than an enumeration of common multiplicities suggests. Indeed, some multiplicities may not be understandable! Especially problematic are "silent multiplicities," observations and potential observations that have not been reported by the researcher and whose existence the researcher may not even recognize (1). It is not intuitive to view observations not made as observations.
A type of silent multiplicity is the subject of an elegant essay by Stephen Jay Gould (2) . He focuses on "The importance of negative results-nature's apparent silence or nonacquiescence to our expectations."
Failure to recognize multiplicities affects the validity and credibility of biomedical research. Multiplicities threaten every aspect of empirical science. This bold statement will startle some readers because few are even aware of the issue. The story from Oz shows how difficult it is to draw inferences from empirical evidence. Perhaps the clearest examples occur in epidemiological and biomarker studies, which entail multiple variables, potential outcomes, and multiple subsets that might show a treatment benefit. However, the same problems are present in other types of scientific inquiry. When we observe something unusual the gods may be sending a message or they may be rolling dice. How to know which?
In this commentary, I attempt to elucidate the issues and provide recommendations for conducting and reporting results of empirical studies, with emphasis on the problems of multiplicities. To achieve this goal requires traversing some esoteric statistical paths, which I try to make as painless as possible.
No one has a good handle on the problem of multiplicities, as the excursion through Oz is meant to suggest. In particular, I make no claims that I have an inside track. I am confident only that there is no single answer and that no single method resolves every case. In some settings, I argue one way, and in others with the same "data," I take exactly the opposite tack.
Statistical Significance and multiplicities
Most readers will be familiar with statistical significance testing and so I begin there. In the standard frequentist approach, statistical significance means that the P value calculated from experimental results is less than .05. This is assuming a particular instance of a statistical model, a null hypothesis. Typical null hypotheses are that there is no treatment effect, that the behavioral factor in question plays no role in the disease, that the biomarker has no prognostic or predictive relevance, etc. The P value is the probability of observing the actual outcome or an outcome more unusual than that observed, assuming the null hypothesis. Quite apart from considerations of multiplicities, statistical significance is an arcane concept. Few researchers can even repeat the above definition of P value. People usually convert it to something they do understand, but the conversion-almost always an inversion-is essentially always wrong. For example: "The P value is the probability that the results could have occurred by chance alone." This interpretation is ambiguous at best. When pressed for the meaning of "chance" and "could have occurred," the response is usually circular or otherwise incoherent. Such incoherence is more than academic. Much of the world acts as though statistical significance implies truth, which is not even approximately correct.
Statistical significance is widely regarded to be difficult to understand, perhaps even impossible to understand. Some educators (3) go so far as to recommend not teaching it at all: "the assumptions behind [tests of statistical significance] are too stringent … and this, alongside the poor understanding of their meaning means that their teaching should have a limited place in the curriculum, which should instead concentrate upon exploratory analysis and understanding measures of effect." The irony is that "exploratory analyses" and "measures of effect" are impossible to interpret without knowing the context. Both are highly susceptible to problems of multiplicities. Teaching exploratory analyses, say, without recognizing multiplicities and their impact is a disservice to students and to science, and it can lead them to deceive the rest of us. How should one view a biomarker that perfectly identifies the 10 responders of 20 patients in a clinical trial? Is the observation real or spurious? Does proper interpretation depend on whether the biomarker was chosen because it was the most predictive among 10 000 tested and has not been shown otherwise to play a role in the disease?
The null hypothesis plays the central role in frequentist statistical significance. When dealing with multiplicities, "the null hypothesis" is not usually clear. Consider a study with two experimental treatments, A and B, plus a control C. To avoid unnecessarily encumbering calculations, assume that the sample size for C is large in comparison with those for A and B. Ignoring B, the P value (the so-called nominal P value) is .03 for the null hypothesis that A has no effect in comparison with C. For the null hypothesis that B has no effect in comparison with C, the nominal P value is . 10 . But what is the null hypothesis when considering the effects of both A and B? There is no natural answer because the question is ambiguous. Neither A nor B may have an effect. A may have an effect but not B (and one might conclude the opposite). And so on. This ambiguity leads to controversy.
A conventional approach that is typical among statisticians is to regard the null hypothesis to be that neither A nor B has an effect. Statisticians tend to be conservative. Their thinking is as follows. If the experiment had shown an effect of A, then this result would be reported. If it showed an effect of B, then that would be reported. And both would be reported if both showed an effect. To protect against making false claims of any kind, the level of statistical significance is calculated assuming that neither has an effect.
The probability of seeing an effect of either treatment is greater than that for seeing an effect of a particular one of them: "two chances are better than one." The probability of observing one effect or the other is the sum of the two probabilities minus the probability of observing both. This is true generally, but the focus here is under the assumption of no effects of any kind. To protect against inflating the probability of making any incorrect conclusion of effect (type I error) to beyond .05 means raising the bar (lowering the alpha level) for declaring statistical significance. In the case that the two comparisons are independent and treated symmetrically, the new hurdle becomes .0253, for then the probability of declaring an effect of A or B or both is .0253 + .0253 − .0253 2 = .05. Because .03 and .10, the nominal P values for treatments A and B, were both greater than .0253, statistical significance cannot be claimed for either of them.
A standard (and conservative) approximation to the above calculation is to ignore the probability that both treatments have an effect and simply divide .05 by the number of comparisons, giving .025 in the example. This approximation is called a Bonferroni correction. Applying it for 10 comparisons, say, gives the new P value cut point for declaring statistical significance of .005. So for 10 comparisons, if the nominal P value for a particular hypothesis test is greater than .005, then the observation would not be regarded as statistically significant. Using the cut point .005 for significance means that the overall type I error rate is about 5%. Accepting the implicit "statistical penalty" or "taking a statistical hit" compensates for addressing 10 questions in the same study.
But paying a price of any kind for asking more questions seems antithetical to science. Moreover, decreasing the probability of finding something false also decreases the probability of finding something true. That is, lowering the false-positive rate increases the false-negative rate; in other words, it decreases statistical power.
The number of comparisons is critical in this development. But few investigators report denominators for their comparisons and few journals insist on it. This saves embarrassment for both parties because many investigators do not know the denominator! Readers who are tuned in to the problem will assume the worst, perhaps completely discounting the research.
The above arguments apply to all types of multiplicities, including commonly understood ones mentioned above, but also including silent multiplicities. A major distinction of the latter is that assessing the denominator of possibilities may be impossible.
An alternative attitude regarding conditioning inference on the null hypothesis is that truth does not depend on whether another treatment is added to the experiment, or another endpoint is considered, or an extra interim analysis is carried out. The possibility that adding a new treatment or a new comparison changes one's conclusions about the original hypothesis seems unreasonable to some researchers, including sometimes to me. Ignoring multiplicities is implicit in the traditional approach to publication when different comparisons are addressed in the same experiment and published separately. It makes no sense to draw a different conclusion about comparison X when comparison Y is also made than when only comparison X is made … and comparison Y is made in another publication!
In the words of Rothman (4): "The paradox of paying a penalty for having more information is a concept that is commonly accepted. The paradox arises only if we are willing to assume the truth of the universal null hypothesis (meaning that no treatments are effective or no variables play a role, etc); however, the premise of a universal null hypothesis is one that empirical science constantly refutes. It lacks any apparent heuristic value. Therefore the 'penalty for peeking' at the data should be unacceptable to any empiricist. Science comprises a multitude of comparisons, and this simple fact in itself is no cause for alarm."
This argument makes sense to me. So is it unreasonable for statisticians to argue for different conclusions when several treatments are addressed in the same experiment, or when "peeking" at the data several times over the course of an experiment? Whether or not adjustments for multiplicities are appropriate or necessary, applying the same adjustments or any standardized analysis to every type of multiplicity is questionable. The impossibility of a one-size-fits-all approach is a recurring theme in this commentary.
Biomarkers and Prognostic Indices
Biomarker studies usually involve many markers and so are exquisitely sensitive to false positives. The biomarker literature is replete with studies that cannot be reproduced. The inferential issues are similar whether identifying single markers that seem to be predictive or prognostic or when combining markers into a single index.
I will give an example using the many-marker, single-index approach. Consider data from a clinical trial of node-positive breast cancer. I built a one-dimensional prognostic score based on a subset of markers that were prognostic for relapse-free survival. Twenty biomarkers were available for each of the 1550 patients in the trial. I selected five markers from these 20 because they had P values less than .10 in univariate proportional hazards regression. Then I built a multivariable regression equation, combining the five markers into a single score, with higher scores indicating worse prognosis. Figure 1 compares relapse-free survival for patients with high scores-above the median-with that for the other half of the patients who had low scores. The hazard ratio of low to high was .77, which was highly statistically significant (P < .0001). Moreover, categorizing into the four quartiles of scores gives an even more dramatic hazard ratio of .30 when comparing the lowest vs highest quartiles.
The punch line of this example is that the 20 markers were random numbers-"white noise"-with each marker for each patient drawn from the same Gaussian distribution having mean 0 and standard deviation 1. So the markers are utterly meaningless for the relapse-free survival of these patients and for anything else.
The index shown in Figure 1 is a false positive. I constructed it to be such. Confirming the results in a new study with the same design would be successful only 2.5% of the time (low scores will show significantly worse prognosis another 2.5% of the time). Moreover, in most of the cases showing statistical significance, the new (two-sided) P value will be only slightly less than .05.
I did not have to work hard to obtain Figure 1. I followed a protocol that specified generating 20 markers randomly, doing so exactly once, and selecting markers to include in the prognostic index if their univariate P values were less than .10. Were I to repeat the experiment I would get a qualitatively similar result. It's ordained. The P value for the prognostic score will be different, but it is likely to be as impressive as the value of P < .0001 I got the first time.
If conclusions are as strong as this and as wrong as this when the biomarkers are meaningless, biomarker research seems doomed to failure. It is not and for reasons that I will describe. This is fortunate because molecular biomarkers are the keys to unlocking and conquering cancer.
regression to the mean I indicated that a confirmatory study in the above "bogus biomarker" example will show little difference in outcomes between high and low prognostic scores, certainly much less than that shown in Figure 1 . This coming together of the two curves in any confirmation is an instance of regression to the mean. The P value will essentially always be larger in a confirmatory trial even if the markers involved were real and truly involved in the biology of the disease. The reason is that the markers included in the model and the estimates of their coefficients in the model are exquisitely tuned to the data used in building the model. Those data have a random component in addition to any real biology. The coefficients of the model are fit to randomness as well as to biology. The random component tends to be positive precisely because the marker was selected for its positivity. The biology in the confirmatory dataset will be the same, but the randomness will be different and almost always less positive because of the selection process. Hence, the observed effect in a confirmatory study will generally be less.
Regression to the mean is ubiquitous and powerful in medical research and in science generally. Failing to appreciate its impact has led many researchers astray (5). An example is "the placebo effect." When patients improve after taking a placebo, many researchers attribute the improvement to the placebo when in fact it is almost always due to regression to the mean. Similarly, regression to the mean explains most of the observations that "the truth wears off" made by Lehrer (4) in his New Yorker piece on the "decline effect" in scientific research-with the rest of his observations being attributable to selection bias (6) . (Sometimes the truth does indeed wear off, and for reasons that are well understood. For example, many observations about breast cancer in the era before screening mammography no longer hold because screening has dramatically changed the disease called "breast cancer.") Similarly, many of the examples cited by Ioannidis (7) in his discussion of published research results are due to regression to the mean.
Understanding the effects of regression to the mean and adjusting for them are similar to understanding and adjusting for multiple comparisons.
Subset analysis
Subset analysis is a particularly important example of multiplicity. Regression to the mean is pronounced when examining subsets, at least in part because there are many types of patient characteristics (eg, disease stage, age, diet, race, geography) and consequently many possible subsets … and opportunities to be wrong. In a clinical trial, some patients do better than other patients on the experimental treatment relative to control. Some subsets will show a statistically significant treatment effect. A drug may not be effective overall, but there may be an interaction with sex, say, with women showing a benefit, or with disease stage, with patients who have stage II tumors showing a benefit, and so on. The list of possibilities is endless, as is the potential for spurious observations. Consistent with regression to the mean, the vast majority of subset analyses that are taken seriously by sponsors and investigators fail to be confirmed and so lead to disappointment.
Part of the tantalizing aspect of subsets is psychological, with the victims grasping for a positive straw in a negative haystack. Apparent benefits of an experimental drug within patient subsets entrap pharmaceutical and venture capital companies large and small. Like the sirens of Ulysses, subsets lure spellbound medical researchers to rocky shores and shipwreck. The financial losses are particularly great when the wild-goose chase occurs in late stages of product development. And trial participants who hope to receive state-of-the-art therapies while helping investigators learn which treatments will benefit future patients end up doing neither. The fundamental dilemma of modern cancer research is that we cannot make progress without examining effects within subsets. Only a minority of patients benefit from conventional cancer therapies. Administering every available therapy to every patient is not tenable. We must learn which patients benefit and which do not-a subset problem. So we cannot dismiss subset analyses simply because they are dangerous and usually wrong. Proper methodology will entail some level of confirmation. We walk on the thinnest of ice, but we know the ice is thin and so we walk gingerly … or run!
Biomarkers and Confirmation
There are several approaches to handling the multiple comparisons problem in hopes of rescuing biomarker and epidemiology research from the jaws of failure and deceit. I'll mention two solutions. The first requires a complete description of the analytical process followed so that the process followed can be imitated under artificial assumptions such as null hypotheses. In the prognostic score example above, I had a protocol. The protocol included a criterion for determining which of the 20 markers to use in building the score, a statistical analysis plan, and a prescription for determining which value of the observed hazard ratio in comparing below versus above the median score (or for the associated P value) would enable a claim of success.
Given this protocol, an automaton could have carried out the analysis. It is thus possible to simulate the process under the null hypothesis and adjust the criteria used to claim success and thereby ensure that the false-positive rate is controlled at .05, say. Assuming that the observed hazard ratio of 0.77 is a typical outcome of the complicated process involved, it would not be regarded as statistically significant. However, a more extreme hazard ratio-perhaps 0.60-might well be regarded to be significant because the simulation process only very rarely, say less than 5% of the time, gives such a small hazard ratio.
The second solution to multiplicity dilemmas in biomarker research is usually easier to apply than the first one (8) . I'll describe it in terms of an important example (9), the Oncotype DX Recurrence Score (RS). The developers of the RS improved on the protocol I followed in two important ways. First, they used markers (genes, in their case) for which there was published evidence of playing a role in cancer. The investigators' subsequent selection and analysis process was similar to mine, but they added a critical step. Before they published their conclusion they applied the RS in a completely different dataset (eventually, in many different datasets) to confirm its prognostic performance. The P value found in a confirmatory study in an independent dataset is resistant to the problem of multiplicities. Regression to the mean applies, but the magnitude of the regression may be small, in part because investigators selected from genes having prior evidence of involvement in the disease (9) .
The fact that RS is based on many genes is irrelevant as regards confirmation, because it is a single number. Reducing to one dimension is an effective strategy scientifically because it makes the RS easy to confirm. In particular, deviations from RS in particular patients in a confirmation sample are also one-dimensional and so receiver operating characteristic curves are well defined.
But reducing a quantity such as RS to a single dimension has the drawback that it is difficult to change-by adding or dropping a gene, say, or by modifying the coefficient of an existing gene in the score-without raising additional validation issues. A major change may even require restarting the process of confirmation.
In addition to being easier to apply, this second solution is intuitive and reproducible and hence more credible than the first solution. Confirmation in an independent dataset should be a prerequisite for publication. Having such an editorial policy does not completely resolve the problem of irreproducible biomarker studies, but it would markedly reduce their numbers.
Generating a confirmatory dataset may be difficult. Indeed, there might be none available. A standard approach is to divide whatever data are available into two sets, one for building a model and the other for confirming it. To avoid problems of multiplicities, this division should only be made once. In any case, the analytical process should be prospective, including having a protocol and a statistical analysis plan.
Revisiting the story about the tall residents of Oz, the heights in a second sample could be assessed to confirm or not the first sample's observations. Or the first sample could itself have been one of confirmation such as when your trip to Oz was to visit the birthplace of a large number of professional basketball players.
Genome-Wide association Studies
In the gene-discovery era of genome-wide association studies, there are enormous numbers of genes and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). What kinds of adjustments for multiplicities apply? A dense scan of common variants involves about a million tests (10) . So a Bonferroni adjustment for multiplicities means statistical significance is possible only if the nominal P value is less than 5 × 10 −8 . This value has become a conventional cut point for judging significance. Such a convention exacts a heavy price in terms of false negatives. And showing that individual genes are associated with disease requires enormous sample sizes.
There is no panacea. The best solution is to make all information available to other investigators. One might publish the 5 × 10 −8 tip of the biomarker iceberg but also make data available for all the markers so that future studies can use it as prior information.
This notion is a segue into the next section.
the Bayesian Perspective
Arguments against adjusting for multiple comparisons have a Bayesian flavor. It is well known that the Bayesian approach "takes the data at face value" when calculating statistical measures of evidence. It is based on the probability of the data actually observed, as compared with frequentist P values that include probabilities of tail areas and of other data that might have occurred but did not. Bayesian probabilities are for treatment effects, whereas frequentist probabilities refer to data assuming particular values of treatment effects. I'll begin with an example of calculating P values. Suppose the response rate of standard therapy is known to be 20%. Suppose five of 10 patients respond to a new therapy, an observed response rate of 50%. Finding the P value means assuming that the new therapy has a 20% response rate and calculating the probability of results as or more extreme than five responses out of 10. This probability is strongly dependent on the trial's protocol. If the design specified accruing exactly 10 patients, then the (one-sided) P value is the total probability of five or more responses out of 10. This turns out to be .033.
Other designs may give different P values for these same data. To be specific about an alternative design while introducing a type of multiplicity, suppose the trial allowed for two stages with a second cohort of 10 patients to be added if there are fewer than five responses in the first cohort of 10. For such a design, there is no natural interpretation of data that would be "more extreme" than the observed five out of the first 10. Although it is somewhat arbitrary, suppose eight or more responses of the total of 20 patientsor five of more responses of the first 10 patients-would result in rejecting the null hypothesis that the true response rate is 20%. The type I error rate of this design is .052 (the calculation is not difficult but is beside the point and is not shown). So the result "five responses out of 10" is no longer statistically significant at the 5% level. Here again, it seems wrong to some researchers, for results that might have been observed (had there been a second stage) but were not observed (because there was no second stage) could affect conclusions from the trial.
Bayesian measures depend on the actual observations and do not have this characteristic. For example, one Bayesian measure is the probability that the new therapy's response rate is greater than 20% given the observed data, five responses of 10 patients. Calculations require specifying a prior probability distribution (5) .
However, the Bayesian approach is not as cavalier as "take the data at face value" may suggest. The proper interpretation of "the data" includes all available evidence and not just numbers. The evidence includes that the trial was conducted in the first place. In the Bayesian approach, the background information of the trial is part of the prior probability distribution of the various parameters. The number of comparisons affects the prior distribution, but assessing a prior distribution in the context of multiplicities is complicated (11) (12) (13) .
A relatively easy-although not always realistic-Bayesian application is when there are competing hypotheses and exactly one is known to be true. Perhaps the hypotheses are genes, only one of which can cause the disease. If there are a million hypotheses as in the genome-wide association studies example, and the investigator is just looking for something to rear its head, then all the prior probabilities are the same and therefore all equal .000001. Experimental results will change these probabilities via Bayes rule, increasing some and decreasing others.
Confirmation is important in both the frequentist and Bayesian settings. In the frequentist approach, one specifies a particular (single) hypothesis to be confirmed, based on prior evidence, and makes no adjustments in the P value. In the Bayesian approach, one gives a high prior probability to a hypothesis of particular interest. So the former distinguishes whether or not there is prior evidence about a hypothesis, whereas the Bayesian approach allows forand, in fact, requires-quantifying the strength of such evidence.
Taking a Bayesian approach, consider a hypothesis (eg, a gene or SNP as a biomarker in the genome-wide association studies example) having a prior probability of .000001. Suppose an experiment strongly implicates that hypothesis (eg, that a SNP is located in a chromosomal region already containing two other genes strongly prognostic for a particular disease) and, in particular, the probability of the results under the hypothesis is 1000 times as large as that for an average hypothesis other than the one in question. (The value 1000 is called a Bayes factor.) The updated (posterior) probability of this hypothesis increases from .000001 to about .001.
Confirmation can be cumulative across experiments and studies. Thus, a second and independent experiment that is equally strong with regard to this same hypothesis would give it more than token credibility (eg, it is shown in an independent population that those having the SNP variant in one or both alleles are more likely to get the disease, and the probability is higher for two alleles than for one). To be specific, a second Bayes factor of 1000 would increase the probability of this hypothesis to about ½. The combined evidence is quite strong. Since the complementary probability is also ½, this one hypothesis in a million would then carry the same posterior probability as all the other 999 999 hypotheses combined.
As I've indicated, a properly conducted Bayesian solution accounts for multiplicities. But there is no off-the-shelf Bayesian solution to be applied by rote. For example, the same numerical data can give different conclusions depending on the context, which is part of the evidence. "Context" includes evidence that is available separately from the experiment in question. For example, it may be a confirmatory experiment as opposed to one that is exploratory. Similarly, the experiment may be designed to see if a monoclonal antibody designed to hit a particular target in fact hits the target, as opposed to whether a "dirty drug" hits any target. (In the formalism of Bayes rule, this evidence can be reflected either in the prior probability distribution or in the Bayes factor [but not in both because that would be using the same evidence twice].)
The need to consider context in carrying out Bayesian analyses implies that they are subjective (14) . For example, the available evidence about the heights of residents of Oz could be assessed in the form of a probability distribution. If there is prior evidence that they are tall, then observing a sample of tall Ozians is supportive, and the posterior distribution is a bolstered-or more concentrated-version of the prior distribution. If there is no such prior evidence, then a moderate-sized sample of tall Ozians shifts the probability somewhat, but perhaps at most into a range that is suggestive and requiring of further confirmation. Both statements hold regardless of the number of variables measured in traveling through Oz. However, having a larger number of variables makes the prior probability assessment process more difficult.
The "data" in the Bayesian approach includes all the evidence at hand, including the fact that an investigator requests a statistical analysis. Incorporating contextual information into a Bayesian analysis is not easy, but the issues are similar to those involved in the story of Oz. To help in assessing the evidence I'd like to ask the investigator why he's asking. And why didn't he ask me to analyze last week's data? (These questions refer to silent multiplicities.) But to preserve our relationship and to have him think of me as other than a lunatic, I ask instead about other evidence available that may be associated with the questions of interest, even remotely, from his lab or clinic and from other labs or clinics. I ask about the biology. And I ask from whence his data. Is it the full experiment? Is it the only time he ran the experiment? Has he dropped some results because they did not fit with expectations? Has he processed the data in any way rather than giving me the full raw data? Did he average to get any of the entries? When there are some duplicates, why are there no duplicates for others of the entries? And other similar questions. I then try to piece together the independent aspects of the "data." I cannot usually do this formally, but I can come away with a reasonable prior probability distribution, one that is minimally encumbered by the actual numeric observations.
retrospective Confirmation à la Bayes
Inference is symmetric in time and space. Confirmation can be based on previous experiments (except that prospective confirmation is susceptible to fewer types of biases). I will give a personal example. Muss et al. (15) considered a clinical trial in node-positive breast cancer that was conducted in the late 1980s. It showed that patients receiving relatively high doses of adjuvant cyclophosphamide, doxorubicin, and 5-fluorouracil received a substantially greater benefit in disease-free survival than did those who received only half of those doses, but only if their tumors overexpressed human epidermal growth factor receptor 2 (HER2). The study protocol stated that we would analyze more than 20 different markers, including HER2. (The main marker of interest at the time was S-phase fraction, which was given as the example for power calculations in the study protocol.)
The objective of the study was to address whether any of these markers was prognostic. So, for example, were high or low levels of any marker associated with longer disease-free survival, ignoring treatment? This seemed uninteresting to me because it was of limited clinical import, and so in analyzing the data, I addressed whether any markers were clinically relevant in the sense of determining therapy: Were high or low levels of the markers associated with longer disease-free survival for high dose but not for low dose?
The answer was yes, for HER2. Patients with tumors that overexpressed HER2 received a benefit from high doses, but those with normal HER2 expression did not, and this interaction was statistically significant. However, this analysis was not specified in the protocol and in standard parlance would be called "exploratory." Moreover, accounting for the multiplicity of markers using Bonferroni or some such adjustment lost the statistical significance of the interaction.
My approach was Bayesian. I went to the literature and obtained a variety of clinical datasets to understand whether they were confirmatory and to build a prior probability distribution retrospectively. The HER2 literature of the time focused on whether this marker was prognostic. Conclusions were mixed. But it turned out that HER2 overexpression was not usually prognostic if the patients had received doxorubicin and that it was a poor prognostic indicator if the patients had not received an anthracycline. (Some studies that evaluated CMF [cyclophosphamide, methotrexate, fluorouracil] therapy actually suggested a greater benefit for CMF in patients with normal HER2 expression than in patients with HER2-overexpressing tumors.) The literature supported the thesis that patients whose tumors overexpressed HER2 benefited from anthracyclines but not those with normal expression of HER2.
I outlined this inferential process and provided additional datasets supporting the HER2-anthracycline interaction thesis in a volume dealing with Bayesian statistics (16) . This "confirmation in reverse" gave me the confidence to agree to publishing Muss et al. (15) . Since that time, a number of trials (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) have further implicated the association between anthracyclines and HER2 status, providing additional confirmation.
reproducible research
My standard approach to analyzing data is-or at least it has been-to make data plots, calculate descriptive statistics, such as means within various treatment groups, decide whether anything is "going on," and then calculate inferential quantities such as P values or posterior probabilities. Another statistician may have come to a conclusion different from mine. A reasonable question to ask each other is, "So what did you do?" It may be impossible to give a complete answer. Indeed, it is sometimes hard to reconstruct one's own previous analyses. Did I take logarithms of the measurements before I decided to switch to square roots? Did I consider other transformations? How did I handle patients who were ineligible for the protocol? An even more difficult set of questions has to do with why I did what I did. In view of the many possible paths taken and not taken, the answers are relevant in drawing conclusions, as we have seen.
One solution is to have a prospective protocol (or a statistical analysis plan), keeping track of any deviations from the protocol (and the reasons for the deviations). Included in the recorded deviations are those taken but not pursued further and that do not show up in the final analysis.
"Reproducible research" is a term coined by empirical scientists in trying to make research more efficient. Postdocs may take a whole year trying to reproduce the results of last year's postdocs. The solution is to keep meticulously detailed logs. Statisticians apply the term reproducible research to statistical analyses (23) . The detailed logs allow others to reproduce analyses, but they also enable adjusting for multiplicities. Although this does not make the question of multiplicity adjustment less controversial, having a complete description of what was done increases the credibility of any conclusions. Statements such as, "The log-rank test showed that the treatment effect is statistically significant in this population" are meaningless in the absence of such a description.
Silent multiplicities can play a role in the lack of reproducibility of research. In a recent commentary in Nature (24), C. Glenn Begley reported that 47 of 53 experiments published by academic laboratories could not be replicated by his team. In an interview with Reuters (25), Begley described a meeting with one of the investigators whose results could not be reproduced: "We went through the [investigator's] paper line by line, figure by figure, said Begley. I explained [to him] that we re-did their experiment 50 times and never got their result. He said they'd done it six times and got this result once, but put it in the paper because it made the best story." (25) The other five experiments were apparently never mentioned in the investigator's paper (an oversight that borders on scientific fraud). When he revealed their existence, the silent multiplicity became loud. Keeping silent through the publication process has become conventional in academia, and it is encouraged by journals' attitudes regarding what research is publishable. Reports of research may be the truth but not the whole truth. What readers have not been told may be more important than what they have been told.
recommendations for Investigators (and Journals)
The following are my recommendations for authors and journals regarding publishing research. They are built upon two overriding principles. One is to have a protocol. The other is to report everything you planned to do and everything you did. There is then no need to address silent multiplicities because your report will have made everything known! 1. Need for a protocol. Prepare a study protocol in advance of the study. The protocol should specify the study's goals and methods. It should say precisely what analyses will be done, which possible results of these analyses will lead to other analyses, etc. It should address how the various multiplicities will be handled. These multiplicities include subset analyses, interim analyses, the various endpoints addressed, the various statistical calculations to be made, including which covariates, etc. 2. Analyses not done. Indicate in your report what analyses or endpoints or subsets were specified in the protocol but were not included in the report, and why. 3. Log of actual analyses. Keep a log of all analyses, including those not specified in the protocol but were carried out nonetheless, whether or not they will be reported. The log should be sufficiently detailed that others can reproduce the conclusions. The cover letter to the editor should indicate the existence of this log and that it is available to reviewers upon request. 4. Unspecified analyses. Discoveries from analyses not specified in the protocol may be publishable, but the relationship between the goal of the study and the discovery should be made clear in the publication, including whether the discovery was serendipitous. For example, your results may suggest that tumor response depends on age, which you had not anticipated in the protocol. Include a discussion of the available supportive and conflicting evidence for the discovery, both biological and empirical. To the extent possible, address multiplicities such as multiple comparisons, transformations, subgroups, etc, and the relevant denominator(s) for the multiplicities. Indicate whether P values or confidence intervals are adjusted for multiplicities, and identify the multiplicities. 5. To adjust for multiplicities or not? Adjusting is usually preferable. Assuming that items 1 through 3 above are satisfied, then adjusting is not essential. However, if you do not adjust for multiplicities, then you must provide a rationale. If part of the rationale is that there is a literature supporting your thesis and so your study is one of confirmation, then the need to have a complete literature survey raises additional multiplicity questions, such as how you conducted the search and how you chose which other studies to include, and these too should be described. 6. Confirmation. Confirmation is an essential aspect of discovery. If a study does not have internal confirmation (such as a second independent dataset), then the conclusion should be supported in some other way. One possibility is via the motivation for the study, such as previous studies implicating a particular risk factor in a disease. Another is a well-conducted literature review. 7. Piecemeal publication. Some studies are published piecemeal. In each publication, the full study and previous publications and analyses (including those not published) should be described. Cross-publication multiplicities carry the same onus for adjustment and confirmation as do within-publication multiplicities. 8. Biological rationale. This is a knotty issue. Obviously, it is best to have and to give a biological explanation for any empirical observation, especially if the explanation occurred before the observation. The human mind is capable of retrospectively building a rationale for any observation, including when the observation is wrong! However, specifying a biological mechanism, even post hoc, opens the possibility of independent testing through other approaches by other groups. 9. Frequentist versus Bayesian. Both approaches are acceptable.
The philosophical differences lead to some differences in handling multiplicities in the inferential process, but the basic principles of the need to "adjust" or "shrink" unusual observations are similar. And both have similar attitudes to confirmation and the advantages of prospective studies. 10. REMARK criteria. For biomarker studies, follow the REMARK criteria (26) in addition to the above.
epilogue Multiplicities cast a shadow over all cancer research. Researchers must be aware of the problem and deal with its insidious consequences, including understanding that multiplicities are sometimes silent. The rub is that progress in personalized medicine requires exposing ourselves to the hazards of multiplicities. Cancer is a complicated, multidimensional disease. Focusing on a single gene or a single pathway will not eliminate the disease. Taking a broader perspective and considering cancer's many facets is hazardous, but it's also necessary. The problems of multiplicity are ubiquitous, in scientific research and in life generally. An instructive example of "the complexities of reality" is the so-called Umbrella Man at the Kennedy assassination in Dallas, as recounted by Josiah Thompson, author of "Six Seconds in Dallas," (27) in a video interview by Errol Morris (28) . A man carrying an open umbrella was near Kennedy's car at the time he was assassinated. However, it was a beautiful day, and no one else in any photograph taken on that day had an umbrella. One theory posited that the Umbrella Man was the real assassin and the weapon was hidden in the umbrella. Thompson refers to John Updike's (29) comment on the Umbrella Man to the effect that "If you put any event under a microscope you will find a whole dimension of completely weird, incredible things going on. It's as if there's a macro level of historical research where things sort of obey natural laws …, and then there's this other level where everything is really weird."
As I've suggested, an apparently extraordinary observation becomes quite ordinary when there are many opportunities to observe something unusual. And when we observe something unusual the gods may be sending a message or they may be rolling dice. Researchers think their study is the former. Empirically speaking, it's usually the latter.
